ESTIMATING JUDICIAL IDEAL POINTS IN A BIDIMENSIONAL COURT

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Abstract

The empirical literature has consistently shown that judicial ideal points can be estimated in a one-dimensional space that reflects the traditional conservative-progressive dichotomy. In this paper we develop an empirical methodology to analyze bidimensional courts. We apply the analysis to the particular case of the *Consell de Garanties Estatutàries de Catalunya* (Catalan Constitutional Court). The results illustrate that one dimension (Spanish-Catalan sovereignty) tends to explain polarization while issues that can be classified as pertaining to the the second dimension (cases on the conservative-progressive grounds) seem more likely to reflect dissent suppression. Policy conclusions are derived.

Keywords: judicial behavior, empirical legal studies, ideal point, ideology, dissent suppression.

I.   Introduction

Although empirical results suggest that judges do not have temporally constant ideal points (Martin and Quinn 2002), they seem to correlate quite significantly with the general perception of which ones are conservative or liberal (see, for example, Segal and Spaeth 2002). Therefore, ideal point estimations are still viewed as a helpful measurement to predict judicial behavior.

It is known that in the context of civil rights, civil liberties, economics and issues related to federalism, judicial ideal points evolve through time, although there is no consensus over the absolute determinants of their evolution. Therefore, different explanations have been developed to contextualize static or dynamic preferences as revealed by ideal point estimations.

The American literature has now been expanded to other courts, thus providing for a refined method for estimating an individual ideal point based on how each judge manifests his or her views in dissenting and concurring opinions.[1] Technically, the empirical method of estimation reveals those points in some n–dimensional space of politically relevant choices, which judges prefer over all other points in that space. The spatial voting approach allows scholars to estimate judicial ideal points by ranking them in one or more dimensions.[2]

Since the method is based on separate opinions, more recent literature has suggested new empirical methods to uncover dissent suppression (Fischman 2011 and Dalla Pellegrina et. al. 2017). The

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[1] *See* mainly Martin and Quinn (2002) as well as Jackman (2001), Bafumi et. al. (2005), Peress (2009), Hanretty (2012a, 2012b), Clinton et. al. (2004), Dalla Pellegrina et. al. (2012, 2014, 2017), González Bertomeu et. al. (2017).

[2] Ferreira and Mueller (2014) identify two dimensions in the Brazilian Supreme Court. Rather than aligning along the usual conservative-progressive dimension, the authors find that the main dimension is for or against the executive branch's economic interests. A second uncovered dimension is for and against states's autonomy to set their own laws.

general approach is to use panel variations to analyze the extent to which consensus voting (that is,

the absence of dissents or concurring opinions) hides divisions in the court.

In this article, we analyze a specific example of an institution known to be part of a bidimensional

policy space which is quite unique (Aragonès, 2007a and 2007b). In fact, the *Consell de Garanties*

Estatutàries de Catalunya (hereafter CGEC; we use the English translation Catalan Constitutional

Court subject to appropriate qualifications about the nature of this institution[3]) has two fundamental

axes in the relevant policy dimensions. One is the traditional conservative-progressive axis, common

to most constitutional courts around the world. Inevitably, there are judges close to the right-wing

conservative parties (PP[4]/Popular Party and CiU[5]/Convergence and Union) and judges close to the

left-wing progressive parties (PSOE-PSC[6]/Socialists, ERC[7]/Republicans, ICV[8]/Green Party).

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[3] The institutional nature of the CGEC is a matter of debate. Strictly speaking, it is not a constitutional court since Catalonia does not have a sovereign constitution. Within the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, it is a body of administrative review that controls the activity of the Catalan Government and Parliament. Its institutional role in no way competes or overshadows the Spanish Constitutional Court. However, given its importance within the political dynamics of Catalonia, we have translated CGEC to "Catalan Constitutional Court" in a very broad sense. A similar reasoning applies to its members. Technically they are not judges in law but advising councilors or Council members exercising abstract review. However, again, due to the function they play, we refer to the CGEC members as "judges".

[4] PP is the Spanish rightist party. It has ruled Spain under Aznar (1996-2004) and Rajoy (since 2011). Traditionally it has been a minor party in Catalonia. PP got 14 seats in 2006, 18 seats in 2010, 19 seats in 2012. In 2015, PP was reduced to 11 seats while competing with an empowered Ciutadans, a new centrist party, which elected 25 members to the Catalan Parliament.

[5] CiU was a Catalan center-right coalition that advocated more decentralization. It was the largest party in Catalonia until it was dissolved in 2015. An increasing shift to pro-independence created internal divisions that could not be solved. It ruled Catalonia with Jordi Pujol (1980-2003) and Artur Mas (2010-2016). CiU elected 48 seats in 2006, 62 in 2010, 50 in 2012. In 2015, the pro-independence wing elected 62 seats in coalition with ERC and other minor parties (*Junts pel Sí*). The supporters of the independence agenda formed a new party in 2016, Catalan European Democratic Party.

[6] PSOE is the Spanish center-left party (under the label PSC in Catalonia). It has ruled Spain under González (1982-1996) and Zapatero (2004-2011). It used to be the strongest party in the Catalan left, mixing decentralization claims with a progressive agenda. It ruled Catalonia in coalition with ERC and ICV under Maragall (2003-2006) and Montilla (2006-2010). PSOE/PSC got 37 seats in 2006, 28 seats in 2010, 20 seats in 2012, 16 seats in 2015. It is currently a minor party in the new Catalan party system.

[7] ERC is the pro-independence party with a progressive agenda. It was part of the Catalan ruling coalition from 2003 to 2010 with PSOE-PSC and ICV. ERC got 21 seats in 2006, 10 seats in 2010, 21 seats in 2012. In 2015, ERC joined the pro-independence wing of CIU and other minor parties electing 62 seats (*Junts pel Sí*). It is now the major progressive party in Catalonia.

[8] ICV is a leftist green Catalan coalition that run together with IU, the Spanish communist and radical left, before the rising of Podemos in 2015. It was part of the Catalan ruling coalition from 2003 to 2010 with PSOE-PSC and ERC. ICV got 12 seats in 2006, 10 seats in 2010, 13 seats in 2012. In 2015, ICV joined a new coalition, *Catalunya Sí que es Pot*, with Podemos and IU. They elected 11 seats.

However, a second significant dimension coexists: those who favor Spanish sovereignty (PP and PSOE-PSC, as Spanish parties) versus those who favor Catalan sovereignty (CiU and ERC, as Catalan parties while ICV is a Catalan party in coalition with the IU/Communists, a Spanish party).[9] Consequently, traditional Catalan politics is dominated by two different dimensions (public policy and sovereignty). However, the identification of these two dimensions is challenged by the fact that they are likely to be correlated, although not perfectly, an aspect which precludes the adoption of a standard two-dimension spatial model.[10]

Our empirical analysis covers the period 2009-2015. The CGEC was created in 2009 in the context of the new Statute of Catalonia (*Estatut d'Autonomia de Catalunya*), approved by the Catalan Parliament in 2006 (which resulted in a major constitutional crisis in Spain).[11] It covers the last period of a left government in Catalonia (up to 2010) and the following CiU government (2010-2015). We used the 2015 Catalan elections as the cut point since it introduced a major change in the local party system.[12] Due to lags in judicial disposition, our dataset covers both PSC/ERC/ICV (passed before 2010) and CiU (passed after 2010) legislation (about 20%-80% proportion in the dataset).

Our results show that both dimensions, conservative-progressive and Spanish-Catalan sovereignty, are relevant in explaining clustering in the CGEC, but in different ways. One of these two dimensions (Spanish-Catalan sovereignty) predicts judicial polarization and division within the

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[9] By Spanish-Catalan sovereignty axis, we do not mean a debate over conflicts of sovereignty strictly speaking (since Catalonia is part of Spain and this legal discussion falls within the jurisdiction of the Spanish Constitutional Court), but the allocation of powers and competences within legislation that affects Catalonia. Fundamentally, arguments over the defense of Catalan autonomy within Spain. Therefore, alternative denominations could be Spanish-Catalan "powers framework", "competences allocation" or "territorial organization" axis.

[10] See discussion by Padró-Solanet (1996) and Aragonès (2015).

[11] The Statute of Catalonia was voted on September 2005 by the Catalan Parliament (PSOE-PSC, ERC, ICV, CiU in favor and PP against) and passed in referendum later in June 2006 by 74%. Several articles were challenged in the Spanish Constitutional Court (mostly petitions filed by PP). The Court decided in June 2010 for the overall constitutionality of the Statute of Catalonia (by a 6-4 vote) with a few exceptions. For example, the Court decided that the decisions of the CGEC are not legally binding.

[12] See Aragonès (2015), Orriols and Rodon (2015), Martí and Cetrà (2016), Simón (2016).

CGEC (for example, we find dissent to be more common among Catalan sovereignty judges than otherwise). Disputes dealing with the more conventional conservative-progressive grounds appear more significantly correlated to dissent suppression or avoidance. These findings seem consistent with the general feeling that party divisions in the period 2009-2015 were more driven by the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty question than other public policy divisions (Aragonès 2015). In fact, the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty axis is likely to be more present than the standard conservative-progressive axis in assessing the most controversial legislation, not least because Catalan institutions are requested to logde petitions with the CGEC before they can litigate in the Spanish Constitutional Court.

The article is structured as follows. In Part II, we describe the main political and institutional features of the Catalan case, and, in Part III, we explain our methodology. Results are presented in Part IV to Part VII. Finally, in Part VIII, we conclude the article.

II. The Institutional and Political Background

(A) Catalan Advisory Council (before 2009)

The CGEC finds its immediate precedent in the Advisory Council[13] foreseen by Article 41 of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy that was enacted in 1979: *"a Catalan law will create and regulate the operation of a consultative body which will decide, in the cases determined by the same law, whether bills or proposed laws submitted for debate and approval by the Parliament of Catalonia comply with this Statute. The lodging of an appeal of unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court by the Executive Council or Government of Catalonia or by the Parliament of Catalonia will require a prior opinion from this body."*[14]

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[13] On the origin and evolution of the Advisory Council, see Arróñiz (2009).

[14] Official translation of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 1979 available at: http://web.gencat.cat/en/generalitat/estatut/estatut1979/index.html.

This consultative body was created by the *Catalan Act 1/1981, of February 25, on the creation of the Advisory Body of the* Generalitat.[15] The main functions of this body consisted essentially in protecting the Catalan autonomy, ensuring the self-government of Catalonia, enforcing the respect of the Spanish Constitution and the Catalan Statue of Autonomy through a control of constitutionality and statutory review, and seeking the development of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy through the publication of opinions with an *auctoritas* that endorsed their observance. These functions had to be exercised by the Council "*with organic and functional autonomy in order to guarantee its objectivity and independence*" (Article 1.2 Act 1/1981).

The Advisory Council was composed of seven members appointed by the President of the *Generalitat* among legal professionals who possessed renowned competence for the position, who enjoyed the Catalan political condition and who had more than seven years of professional experience. In terms of nomination of members for the Council, five members were nominated by the Parliament of Catalonia with a three fifths majority of its members and two members were nominated by the *Generalitat*. The Catalan Act 1/1981 established an appointment period of four years, although half of them were renewed every two years (Article 3 Act 1/1981).

Initially, the Advisory Council issued two types of opinions (Article 8 of Act 1/1981): (a) *opinions on the adaptation to the Catalan Statute of Autonomy of draft bills and proposals submitted for debate and approval by the Catalan Parliament*, at the request of two parliamentary groups, a one tenth majority of members of the Parliament or the Catalan Government; and (b) *opinions on Spanish legislation prior to the lodging of appeals by the Catalan Parliament or the Catalan Government before the Spanish Constitutional Court on the basis of unconstitutionality*, at the request of two parliamentary groups or one tenth of the members of the Parliament. The Advisory Council also issued (c) *opinions on Spanish legislation prior to the lodging of conflicts of powers before the Constitutional Court*, at the request of the Catalan Government. This function was not foreseen by Act 1/1981 but it was based on Article 12 a) of the *Catalan Decree 429/1981, on the Provisional Regulation on the Organization and Functioning of the Advisory Council of the*

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[15] Official Journal of the Generalitat of Catalonia, num. 114, of March 4, 1981.

Generalitat of Catalonia.[16] Finally, in 1999, *Act 4/1999, of July 12, modifying Article 8 of Act 1/1981*[17] empowered the Council to issue a new type of opinion: (d) *opinions on Spanish legislation prior to the lodging of conflicts for the defense of local autonomy before the Constitutional Court*, at the request of the local entities of Catalonia. All these opinions were not binding and had either optional –opinions foreseen in letters (a) and (c)- or mandatory –opinions foreseen in letters (b) and (d)- nature.

Legal scholars analyzing the opinions of the Advisory Council divided its activity into 4 periods[18]:

- The first period began in 1981 and finished in 1986. The Advisory Council established an innovative and creative doctrine that aimed at delimitating the distribution of powers between the State and the *Generalitat*, as well as examining sensible regional issues for Catalan public authorities. Most opinions of the Advisory Council in this period were opinions issued prior to the lodging of conflicts of powers (60%). Opinions based on the control prior to constitutional review (25%) and the internal parliamentary control (15%) had less importance. Moreover, most opinions of the Advisory Council were unanimous (only 7% of them included dissenting opinions), which showed a high degree of consensus among its members.

- The second period began in 1987 and finished in 1999. In this period, the doctrine previously established by the Advisory Council was consolidated. The number of opinions issued prior to the lodging of conflicts of powers reduced (10,8%), while opinions based on the control of constitutionality and of statutory prior to constitutional review (61,4%) and those related to the internal parliamentary control (27,8%) increased. In this period, 27% of the opinions issued included dissenting opinions.

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[16] Official Journal of the *Generalitat* of Catalonia, num. 181, of Desember 2, 1981.

[17] Official Journal of the *Generalitat* of Catalonia, num. 2931, of July 15, 1999.

[18] For further information about these periods, see Arróñiz (2009).

It must be noted that in this period the Spanish Constitutional Court dealt with the regional power to create regional advisory bodies. The Constitutional Court, in its judgment num. 204/1992, of November 26, confirmed the constitutionality of the regional power to create, by virtue of their powers of self-organization, advisory bodies equivalent to the Spanish Council of State (*Consejo de Estado*) and added that these bodies were not limited to assume functions different from those of the national institution (*Consejo de Estado*), but even to substitute or excluding it. To this end, the organization and operation system of these bodies had to ensure "*their independence, objectivity and rigorous technical qualification*".

- The third period began in 2000 and finished in 2007, when the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy was enacted. In this period, opinions of the Advisory Council showed very critical with judgments of the Spanish Constitutional Court that interpreted some state powers in a more expansive, centralized manner. The more usual opinions were those issued prior to constitutional review (74%). Moreover, dissenting opinions more than doubled in this period (59%).

- The final period of the Advisory Council was a transitory period that covered years 2008 and 2009. In this period, 50% of opinions were issued prior to the constitutional review and 50% of opinions dealt with draft bills that had to be approved by the Catalan Parliament. More than 50% of these opinions included dissenting opinions.

(B) CGEC (after 2009)

In 2006, Articles 76-77 of the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy replaced the Advisory Council with the CGEC, whose composition and functioning are established by *Act 2/2009, of February 12, on the Council*

for Statutory Guarantees[19] and by *Resolution of May 25, 2010, that publishes the Regulation for the Organization and Functioning of the Council for Statutory Guarantees.*[20]

The CGEC is defined as "*the institution of the Generalitat that ensures that the regulations of the Generalitat comply with this Statute of Autonomy and the Constitution*"[21] (Article 76.1 Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 2006). To this end, the Statute of Autonomy recognizes that the CGEC "*has organic, functional and budgetary autonomy in accordance with the law*" (Article 77.4 Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 2006).

The CGEC is composed of nine judges, who elect a President among themselves (Article 3 Act 2/2009). These judges must be legal professionals that possess renowned competence and prestige for the position, they must have more than 15 years of professional experience and some attachment to Catalonia (*veïnatge civil català*). They are appointed by the President of the *Generalitat*. In terms of nomination, six members are nominated by the Catalan Parliament with a three fifths majority, and the other three members are nominated by the *Generalitat*. One of these three members is chosen from a list prepared by the Council of Local Governments. The members of the CGEC are appointed for 9-year nonrenewable term. The CGEC itself is renewed by thirds every three years and in each renewal the Catalan Parliament and Government appoint two and one new judges, respectively.[22]

The CGEC issues the following types of opinions:

- Opinions on the (1) *compliance with the Constitution of draft bills and proposals to reform the Catalan Statute of Autonomy*, prior to their approval by the Catalan Parliament; on the (2) *compliance with the Catalan Statute of Autonomy and the Spanish Constitution of Government bills and Parliamentary bills*

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[19] Official Journal of the *Generalitat* of Catalonia, num. 5321, of February 18, 2009.

[20] Official Journal of the *Generalitat* of Catalonia, num. 5645, of June 8, 2010.

[21] On the functions of the new CGEC, see Aparicio (2009).

[22] A good introduction to the composition and organization of the CGEC is provided by Pla (2009).

submitted for debate and approval by the Catalan Parliament, and of legal decrees subject to validation by the Catalan Parliament; on the (3) *compliance with the Catalan Statute of Autonomy and the Spanish Constitution of draft legislative decrees approved by the Catalan Government*; on the (4) *compliance with local autonomy of Government bills and Parliament bills and draft legislative decrees approved by the Catalan Government* under the terms guaranteed by the Catalan Statute of Autonomy (Article 76.2 of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 2006 and Articles 16-19 of Act 2/2009).[23] These opinions, which are non-binding, can be petitioned depending on the case by two parliamentary groups, one tenth of deputies, the Catalan Government and the municipalities or *vegueries*.[24]

- *Opinions about Spanish legislation prior to the lodging before the Constitutional Court of appeals on the basis of unconstitutionality, of conflicts of competence and of conflicts for the defense of local autonomy*. These opinions, which are mandatory but non-binding, can be petitioned depending on the case by a tenth part of members of the Parliament, the Catalan Government or certain local entities.[25]

- *Opinions in relation to Spanish Government bills and Parliament bills that develop or affect the rights recognized in the Catalan Statute of Autonomy*, since Article 38 of the Statute states that "*the Council for Statutory Guarantees protects the rights recognized in Chapters I, II and III of this Title and the Charter of Rights and Obligations of the Citizens of Catalonia*". These opinions are mandatory and can be petitioned by two parliamentary groups, one tenth of members of the Parliament, the Catalan Government and the Catalan Ombudsman (art. 23 Act 2/2009). These opinions are binding only if the bill is considered contrary to the Spanish Constitution or the Catalan Statute of Autonomy.

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[23] On the effects of the opinions of the CGEC in the legislative function of the Catalan Parliament, see Vintró (2009).

[24] Since 2017, Catalonia is territorially divided into eight vegueries: Barcelona, Girona, Tarragona, Terres de l'Ebre, Central Catalonia, Lleida, Alt Pirineu -Aran, and Penedès.

[25] On the opinions prior to the appeals and conflicts to be lodged before the Spanish Constitutional Court, see González (2009).

Articles 38.1 and 76.1, 2 and 4 of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy were challenged before the Spanish

Constitutional Court by 99 MPs of the Popular Party (PP). The Constitutional Court, in its judgment num.

31/2010, of June 28, stated that Article 76.4 was unconstitutional. The pratical consequence of this decision

is that opinions issued by the CGEC on legislation that affects statutory rights are not binding.[26]

The functioning of the CGEC is determined by internal provisions. For organizational purposes, three

positions are foreseen by law: the Presidency, the Vice-Presidency and the Secretary of the CGEC. The

President of the CCGEC is elected by its members by secret ballot for a period of three years, renewable

once. An overall majority is required. If none reaches the majority in the first vote, a second round among

the two most voted candidates takes place. If both candidates get the same number of votes, the most senior

candidate is elected and, in the case of equality in seniority, the oldest one (Article 7 of Act 2/2009 and

Article 11 of Resolution of May 25, 2010). The internal provisions of the CGEC foresee specific rules in

cases where presidency remains vacant for reasons other than the end of term and also for absence, illness,

suspension or loss of membership (Articles 7 of Act 2/2009). Both the Vice-President and the Secretary of

the CGEC are elected by its members for a period of three years, renewable once, by the voting system

established for the President (Articles 8 and 9 of Act 2/2009; Articles 13 and 15 of Resolution of May 25,

2010).

The drafting of opinions is also determined by internal rules. Once the request for an opinion is received, a

plenary session is convened by the President within a period of three days upon the lodge of the petition

(Article 27 of Resolution of May 25, 2010). The CEGC in plenary decides about the admission of the request

by simple majority after having examined that both standing and other procedural requirements are met or

have been amended. In case of inadmissibility, the decision must be reasoned (Article 29 of Resolution of

May 25, 2010). In the same session, the CEGC *en banc* appoints the rapporteur according to a previously

established order, unless otherwise agreed. The rapporteur prepares a proposal according to the general sense

of previous deliberations and discussion (Article 32 of Resolution of May 25, 2010). If his/her proposal

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[26] For additional information regarding the protection of rights by the CGEC and the judgment of the Spanish
Constitutional Court num. 31/2010, of June 28, see Tornos/Vintró (2010) and Delgado (2012).

becomes a minority opinion, the CEGC plenary appoints a new rapporteur (Article 33 of Resolution of May 25, 2010). Once the CGEC clerks, under the direction of the appointed rapporteur, have provided judges with the documentation and the reports needed to elaborate the opinion, a general debate is held on the basic foundations of the opinion that must be issued. This general debate is followed by one or more discussion sessions. The final text of the opinion, which must be completely written and made available to all judges at least twenty-four hours in advance, is discussed and voted *en banc* (Article 36 of Resolution of May 25, 2010).

Unless opinions on legislation and proposals are passed by means of an abbreviated procedure (that must be issued within a period of seven days), opinions on legal decrees (that must be issued within a period of twelve days), and opinions previous to the lodging of conflicts of competence (that also must be issued within a period of twelve days), most opinions must be issued within a period of one month after the receipt of the request (Articles 26-32 of Act 2/2009).

The conclusions of the opinion, which must be voted separately, must establish the CGEC final decision as to whether or not the provisions are contrary to the Spanish Constitution or to the Catalan Statute of Autonomy and whether they are adopted by majority or unanimously (Article 20 of Act 2/2009 and Article 37 of Resolution of May 25, 2010). Judges are entitled to write dissenting opinions within twenty-four hours after the vote (in the case of the opinions referred to draft legislative decrees approved by the Catalan Government or to appeals on the basis of unconstitutionality or conflicts of competence brought by the Catalan Government) or forty-eight hours after the vote (in the other opinions; Article 38 of Resolution of May 25, 2010). The dissenting opinions must be filed with the final opinion. Although dissents are allowed, they are not common in practice.

Opinions are written in Catalan and a version in Spanish is made under the supervision of the CGEC. They are published in the Official Gazette of the Parliament of Catalonia or the Official Journal of the Government of Catalonia, as well as on the Council's website (Article 22 of Law 2/2009 and Article 39 of Resolution of May 25, 2010).

(C) Dataset

Our dataset covers all decisions by the CGEC in the period 2009-2015. There are 124 cases which result in 1098 individual votes (21% covering the PSC/ERC/ICV government and 79% referring to the CiU government). Table 1 presents the main description of our dataset.

[Table one]

There are a few dissents but they are not frequent. There are only 133 individual votes when we consider cases with dissent. They seem slightly more frequent under the PSC/ERC/ICV government than later under the CiU government (27%-73% in these subset of cases). These decisions seem to be more associated with progressive and pro-Spanish sovereignty majorities.

The cases can be assessed in terms of significant conservative–progressive content and relevant Spanish-Catalan sovereignty issues. Notice that most of our empirical analysis does not use this classification (inevitably subjective), but it is important to investigate that legislation majorily related to each of the axes is fairly balanced in the dataset. We find 65 and 93 cases respectively, indicating that an overwhelming proportion of the cases touch the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty dimension confirming the importance of this axis. The immediate observation is that, at the same time, a significant proportion of the cases (34) involve both axes (for examples, legislation regulating consumer rights which includes a controversy over labels in Catalan or Spanish). From the viewpoint of subject, the data does not seem to favor quantitively one axis over the other.

We have twelve judges in our dataset. They are distributed in the following way: 4 from CiU, 3 from PSOE/PSC, 2 from PP and ERC each, and one from ICV. Not all judges have served the entire period since the CGEC operates with nine judges. Details about the CGEC judges can be found in Table two.

[Table two]

III. Methodology

In order to investigate whether a politically driven ideological bias may exist within the CGEC, we initially set up our analysis basing on item response modeling (IRT).[27] We let y_{ij} be the vote of each judge j ($j = 1, \ldots, J$) for decision i ($i = 1, \ldots, N$). We assign a value of one ($y_{ij} = 1$) to dissenting opinions, while a vote aligned with the outcome of the decision receives a value of zero ($y_{ij} = 0$).

Suppose that the unobserved excess utility to a given judge j voting in a particular decision i (z_{ij}) is:

$$z_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta_i \theta_j + e_{ij} \tag{1}$$

where e_{ij} is assumed to have a zero-mean logistic distribution with mean zero and variance $\pi^2/3$. Judge j dissents in decision i ($y_{ij} = 1$) if $z_{ij} > 0$, while providing a unanimous opinion ($y_{ij} = 0$) if $z_{ij} \leq 0$.

According to (1), we assume that each vote responds to personal attributes of the judge as well as the characteristics of the decision. We mainly focus on the judge's ideal point (θ_j), which is a latent variable that can be measured indirectly by observing his/her manifest opinions on some decisions of the Court. We also consider case characteristics that adjust the particular preference of an individual judge to the relevant ideological dimension when faced with a given decision. In particular, β_i (the discrimination parameter in IRT models) provides information on how effectively a decision on a given issue can discriminate between judges on the recovered dimension. We also account for the location of the decision in the relevant space

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[27] *See* Birnbaum (1968) for a general overview of the logistic Item Response Theory.

through the parameter α_i (item difficulty in IRT models). The observed choice by judge j on case i is the observed data matrix containing judges' votes (y_{ij}).

We estimate both judges' ideal points and case parameters following the approach of Maydeu-Olivares et al. (2006). According to the hypotheses outlined above, the probability that judge j dissents on the final decision i taken by the Court is shaped as an item-response problem (equation (2) below) with a logit-link function:

$$(\Pr y_{ij} = 1 | \theta_j, \alpha_i, \beta_i) = 1/(1 + exp(-(\alpha_i + \beta_i \theta_j))). \tag{2}$$

Given the model that generated the votes, the unobserved judge's utility and latent traits, and the vector of case parameters, the associated likelihood function can be written as:

$$L(y_{ij}, z_{ij}, \theta_j, \alpha_i, \beta_i) = p(y_{ij}, z_{ij} | \theta_j, \alpha_i, \beta_i). \tag{3}$$

We apply the numerical approach of Bock and Aitkin (1981) to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the model latent variables and parameters. This methodology uses an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster et al. 1977) to find the maximum likelihood estimates of the marginal likelihood function of the observed data by alternatively applying expectation and maximization steps. In the first of the two steps the expected value of the log likelihood function is computed under the current estimate of θ_j, whereas in the second step a new value of θ_j that maximizes the expected value of the likelihood function is retrieved. The iterative process continues until convergence is achieved.[28] The Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm is used for numerical optimization (see Fletcher 1987).

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[28] We use the mirt package in R to perform the analysis. As highlighted by Chalmers (2012), several R packages can be used to estimate IRT models, including the MCMC package (Martin et al. 2011), which is often used in the estimation of judicial voting. The MCMC package, however, has limitations in that it is computationally demanding, particularly when applied on small datasets and multidimensional problems (see next section).

We assume that the ideal points have a standard normal distribution whereas the item parameters are assumed normal. We exploit the fact that all cases are decided en banc and the random assignment of judges Rapporteursto identify the parameters of the model.[29]

In addition, IRT models are typically identified constraining the position of two judges in a one-dimensional latent space, in such a way that all of the other judges' ideal points are estimated in relation to the constrained positions. However, in our context, we expect that there are two main latent profiles shaping judicial ideology in the CGEC: one is the standard conservative-progressive pattern, whereas the other could reasonably be referred as the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty axis.

Therefore, after ordering the political parties belonging to the Catalan Parliament in the relevant period (2009-2015) along these two dimensions (Table three), we observed that there is positive correlation between the two dimensions (17 %) as also documented by Aragonès (2015). This supports the idea that, because of their common political nature, also the judges' latent ideological traits could be correlated, thus precluding the possibility to estimate judges' preferences according to two distinct, orthogonal, dimensions. Hence, we opted to estimate the model in a single latent trait in order to test whether there is any ideological bias, and if so, which dimension tends to prevail over the other.

[Table three]

In order to constrain the position of two of the judges in the sample without driving the results of our analysis in favor of one or the other dimension, we chose them such that anecdotal evidence supports one judge's bias in favor of both progressives and Catalan sovereignty and the other judge's contemporaneous bias in favor of both conservatives and Spanish sovereignty. Basing on available information regarding judges' alleged political preferences, we started constraining the ideal point of Justice Jaume Vernet i Llobet,

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[29]Because all decisions of the CGEC are taken end banc we do not need to assess the random assignment of judges and cases to panels, as in several other similar analyses conducted using spatial models.

ERC appointee, to be negative (progressive/pro-Catalonia) and Justice Carles Jaume i Fernández, PP appointee, to be positive (conservative/pro-Spain). If at least one relevant dimension is correctly identified, we expect that these judges are relatively polarized, even if not necessarily at the extremes. If, however, we incorrectly identified the relevant dimension(s), these judges will end up being situated in less likely positions.

However, we also expect that the conservative-progressive dimension does not rank judges in the same order as the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty dimension (i.e. the two are not perfectly correlated). Hence, not all judges supporting a progressive/Catalan sovereignty agenda should polarize on the left side of the interval defining the recovered dimension, thereby exhibiting negative ideal points. Similarly, not necessarily all those following a conservative/Spanish sovereignty ideal will polarize on the other side of the interval.

In order to address this problem, we built two dummy variables, Pol_PC and Pol_SC. We assigned value 1 to Pol_PC if a judge has been appointed by a conservative party, while a zero has been associated to judges appointed by a progressive party. In the same vein, Pol_SC takes value 1 if the appointing party is Spanish sovereignty-oriented, and zero otherwise. The most relevant ideological bias will thus be detected according to the presence of a stronger correlation between the political affiliation of judges' appointers (a proxy of judges' alleged political affiliation) and the judges' latent traits estimated through the IRT model.

IV. Results

The results of our estimations are presented in Table four in terms of ideal points' means and standard errors.

[Table four]

As expected, the imposed constraints place Jaume Vernet i Llobet (ERC) in the left extreme cluster of the interval indicating the recovered dimension (negative ideal points), while Carles Jaume i Fernández (PP) is located in the right extreme cluster (positive ideal points).

To check the presence of an ideological pattern we first computed the share of judges appointed by either the conservatives (PP and CiU) or the progressives (remaining parties) that respectively lay below and above the median judge. We did the same with the share of judges appointed by either the Spanish sovereignty (PP and PSOE) or the Catalan sovereignty parties (remaining parties). If any of the dimensions is correctly identified one should expect that a higher share of judges appointed by the conservatives (or the Spanish sovereignty parties) is located above the median judge, whereas a higher share of judges appointed by the progressives (or the Catalan sovereignty parties) is located below the median.

In the baseline version of the model (Table four, sixth column), we find that only two over six judges appointed by the conservatives lie above the median (including the median judge with the higher ideal point) against four of those lying below the median (including the median judge with the lower ideal point). We also find some significant anomalies, namely judges associated with the conservatives, such as Julio Añoveros Trias de Bes (PP), but consistently clustered with a hypothetical progressive group.

Instead, there seems to be stronger evidence in favor of the existence of an ideological bias on the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty axis. Indeed, four over six judges lying above the median are appointed by a pro-Spain sovereignty party against one among those lying below the median (Table four, seventh column).

As aforementioned, in order to be more rigorous in evaluating the existence of any ideological pattern, we computed the correlation between the estimated ideal points and the two binary variables reflecting the appointers' political affiliations (Pol_PC and Pol_SC). As one can see at the bottom of Table four, there is positive correlation (0.43) between the estimated latent dimension and the Spanish-Catalan

sovereignty nature of the appointer (Pol_SC). However, this correlation is not significant according to a two-tailed probability test (p-val = 0.16). There is even weaker and negative correlation (-0.31, p-val = 0.33) between the estimated latent dimension and the dummy Pol_PC.

This outcome could either represent a signal in favor of the fact that CGEC judges are politically neutral (in the sense that they all look statistically very similar), or be indicative of a general poor performance of the baseline model. The Item Response Theory, in fact, tends to suffer from weak predictive power for the ideology of judges who voted too few times, even when dealing with non-unanimous decisions. The result is that these judges tend to show ideal points that concentrate around central positions in the relevant spectrum (i.e. the assumed mean of the latent variable). We do not exclude this possibility, although the correlation between the absolute value of the ideal points (a proxy for the judges' ideological polarization) and the number of dissents per judge does not seem to offer support in its favor (0.04).

We opted for addressing some of the possible shortcomings of the baseline model using an estimation technique that combines the information revealed by judges' manifest behavior (actual votes) with judges' individual predictors. In fact, probabilistic spatial models typically need some amount of voting error in order to avoid forms of perfect outcome prediction of the voting behavior. Again, this becomes a relevant issue when the estimation of latent traits is conducted on small datasets, as in our case.[30] The use of additional variables, other than votes, to predict judicial latent features has thus the purpose to address this issue.

To this aim, we estimated a two-equation full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) model in which the first equation is identical to (2), while letting judges' latent ideology be predicted by judges' individual characteristics as follows:

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[30] The literature has proposed alternative models that contribute to addressing these issues (see, for example, Poole 2005, Poole and Rosenthal 1985, and Rosenthal and Voeten, 2004). However, the estimated latent traits can only reflect an ordinal rank, which does not help in our case, as this involves a relevant loss of information.

$$\theta_j = \varphi + \lambda \tau_j + v_j \qquad\qquad (4)$$

where the error term v_j is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. Compared to the baseline model, the actual votes expressed by each judge now combine with personal observable traits (τ_j) in the optimization process to estimate each judge' latent dimension. Among judges' personal characteristics we include age, the number of cases decided in the relevant period, and the two binary variables Pol_PC and Pol_SC.

The regression output referred to model (1)-(4) is reported in Table five. Compared to the baseline outcome, the Court looks now more clustered according to judges' alleged Spanish-Catalan sovereignty preferences. In fact, the correlation between the estimated ideal points and the binary variable Pol_SC increases to 0.46, but still this correlation turns significant only at 15 % level (p-val = 0.13). The correlation between the estimated ideal points and the binary variable Pol_PC remains weak and approximatively unchanged with respect to the baseline model.

Summarizing, the results obtained using this more refined specification of the model still do not point towards a statistically significant polarization of ideological clusters. However, a noticeable aspect is that the absolute value of judges' ideal points is still uncorrelated with the number of votes expressed in the relevant period of analysis (see bottom of table five). Hence, these models are likely to contribute, at least partially, to the support the existence of apparently neutral positions (or dissent avoidance), rather than reflecting a failure of the ideal point model due to a small-sample dimension. In other word, estimated ideal points clustered around zero tend to favor an interpretation on the lines of judicial neutrality. Investigating whether these positions are truly neutral from an ideological point of view, rather than revealing dissent aversion, will be object of the analysis conducted in the next section.

[Table five]

V. Propensity towards Dissent

Several studies have shown that judicial votes are sometimes biased towards agreement, a phenomenon that tends to smooth the expression of judges' intrinsic ideology. Some authors have specifically attributed these "panel effects" to "dissent aversion" (Posner 2002, 32-4), to a norm of consensus (Fischman 2011), collegial deliberation (Edwards 2003), strategic motivations (Cross and Tiller 1998), judges' abilities (Iaryczower and Katz 2016), and "group polarization" (Sunstein et al. 2006). Others claim that votes are likely to be influenced by the opinions of panel colleagues, especially when circuit courts are analyzed (e.g., Revesz 1997; Peresie 2005; Boyd et al. 2010).

A noticeable aspect is that the attitude towards dissent, especially when it is heterogeneous across judges, may confound with judges' true political ideology, distorting its estimated value. Unbundling these two features should release a measure of pure political ideology, isolated from any other effect that could preclude the expression of sincere opinions.

In order to investigate this possibility, we integrate the baseline model with the hypothesis that each judge has her/his own natural propensity towards dissent/consensus. We admit that judicial voting behavior is a function of two latent traits.[31] On the one hand, as in the model presented in the previous section, we assume that political preferences can affect judicial decisions (first estimated dimension). On the other hand, we examine whether actual votes could be also related to a latent measure of propensity towards dissent (second estimated dimension).

We model the multidimensional problem as follows:

$$(\text{Pr } x_{ij}=1|\theta_{1j}, \theta_{2j}, \alpha_i, \beta_{1i}, \beta_2)= 1/(1+exp(-(\alpha_i + \beta_{1i}\,\theta_{1j} + \beta_2\,\theta_{2j}))) \tag{5}$$

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[31] On multidimensional IRT models see, for example, Gibbons and Hedeker (1992), Sheng and Wikle (2007) and McDonald (1999). According to these models, a single factor is believed to be present in all items, but with additional clusters of local dependencies formed by other specific factors (Chalmers 2012).

$$\theta_{1j}=\varphi_1 +\lambda_1 \tau_j+ v_{1j} \tag{6}$$

$$\theta_{2j}=\varphi_2 +\lambda_2 \tau_j+ v_{2j} \tag{7}$$

Like equations (2) and (4), equations (5) and (6) include a latent measure of (allegedly political) ideology (θ_{1j}), along with a second latent trait, θ_{2j}, which we expect to reveal the likelihood that judge j suppresses his/her willingness to dissent when disagreeing with a decision of other colleagues in the panel.

The parameters β_{1i} and β_2 reflect the discriminatory power of case i relative to each estimated dimension. As in the previous section, the model is identified imposing the usual constraints on two judges' alleged political preferences in the first estimated dimension (Justices Jaume Vernet i Llobet and Carles Jaume i Fernández). We do not constrain any position in the second dimension, while instead setting β_2 to be positive and constant across cases and judges, so that θ_{2j} captures each judge's "genuine" propensity towards dissent (i.e., the higher is θ_{2j} the stronger the judge's taste for disagreement).

The results, again computed coding votes on the basis of actual dissents, are reported in Table six for the sub-sample of non-unanimous decisions. The columns in the upper part of the table reproduce the structure of Tables four and five (estimates of θ_{1j}), whereas the output referring to the second recovered dimension (θ_{2j}) is reported in the lower part.

In general, adding a second dimension aimed at explaining judicial behavior strengthens the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty ranking to a considerable extent. To verify this, like in the previous analysis, we compute the correlation between judges' alleged political affiliation according to the nature of the appointer and the estimated θ_{1j} (Table six, bottom). We find that the correlation between the allegedly political dimension (θ_{1j}) is 0.77 when considering the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty axis, higher and much more significant (p-val. = 0.00) than in the one-dimensional models of the previous section. In addition, all judges appointed by a pro-Spain sovereignty party lie above the median, while none is located below it.

Accordingly, all judges appointed by a pro-Catalan sovereignty party (except Justice Marc Carrillo) lie below the median.

On the contrary, and in line with the previous results, there does not seem to be any form of polarization when looking at the conservative-progressive dimension. Indeed, the correlation between the appointers' political affiliation on the conservative-progressive axis and the estimated θ_{1j} is -0.26, but still not statistically significant (p-val = 0.41). Hence, isolating the component referred to the propensity towards dissent substantially helps revealing the existence of relatively marked political preferences on the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty axis.

In addition, an interesting aspect emerges from the sign and significance of the correlation between the propensity towards dissent (θ_{2j}) and the dummy for whether the appointer is Spanish sovereignty-oriented -0.61 (p-val. 0.04). Because we constrained the associated parameter to be positive, this indicates that judges being allegedly aligned with Catalan sovereignty parties have a higher propensity towards dissent compared to judges being allegedly aligned with Spanish sovereignty parties. There is no similar evidence when correlating the propensity towards dissent with the dummy for whether the appointer is conservative-oriented (correlation is 0.31 p-val. 0.66).

Moreover, the estimated parameters associated to judges' measurable traits in the equation predicting the latent measure of the propensity to dissent (Table seven) offer interesting insights regarding the explanation of judges' political preferences and attitude towards consensus. On the one hand, being appointed by a pro-Spain sovereignty party predicts quite well the judges' ideology in the political dimension (θ_{1j}) (Table seven, column (a)), both for the one-dimension and two-dimension models. On the other hand, being appointed by a pro-Spain sovereignty party limits the estimated willingness to dissent (θ_{2j}) (Table seven, column (c)), which is in line with the results described above (i.e. judges appointed by a pro-Spain sovereignty party tend to dissent less than judges appointed by a pro-Catalan sovereignty party). These

results also confirm the sign and significance of the correlations between the estimated dimensions and the alleged political affiliations of the judges.

[Table six]

[Table seven]

VI. Analysis of unanimous decisions

In the previous section, we used individual information to predict two judges' latent traits: alleged political preference and propensity towards dissent. This allowed a more precise measurement of judges' political ideology, as the latter has been isolated from the attitude towards dissent/consent. We also provided support to the hypothesis that the estimated ideological traits do not reflect full neutrality, at least in the political spectrum. We concluded that the free expression of judges' preferences is likely to be inhibited by judges' individual taste for consensus.

In the previous analysis, we mainly concentrated on judges' latent traits. However, it is possible that each judge, being endowed with his/her own ideology, and regardless of whether he/she is allegedly aligned with some specific parties, tends to react with different intensity (in terms of expression of dissent) to issues challenging laws of different nature.

The purpose of the analysis conducted in this section is to see whether consensus is likely to alter judicial decision-making with different intensity when the challenged law is characterized by either the

Spanish/ Cartalan sovereignty division, or reflects the conservative/ progressist division. We consider all decisions taken by the Court, unanimous and non-unanimous.[32]

A multilevel model is used to perform the analysis. Assuming that judges' ideology has been correctly inferred from non-unanimous decisions (see previous section) the multilevel equation is specified as follows:

$$(\Pr x_{ij}=1|\hat{\theta}_{1j}, \hat{\theta}_{2j}, \alpha_i, \beta_{1i}, \beta_{2k})= 1/(1+exp(-(\alpha_i + \beta_{1i}\,\hat{\theta}_{1j} + \beta_{2k}\,\hat{\theta}_{2j}))) \qquad k = c/p, S/C \quad (8)$$

where the variables have the same meaning as in the previous section. In particular, $\hat{\theta}_{1j}$ and $\hat{\theta}_{2j}$ are the previously estimated traits from model (5)-(7) (corresponding to the output in Tables six and seven), while β_{2k} is the parameter reflecting the intensity of the judges willingness to dissent. Notice that the slope parameter β_{2k} is specific to cases that deal with either the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty (*S/C*) or conservative-progressive (*c/p*) matters (see case classification in Appendix A.1).

Estimates in Table eight suggest evidence of a greater willingness to dissent when the decisions of the CGEC deal with issues related to the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty spectrum, as reflected in the positive and significant parameter $\beta_{2S/C}$ (0.96). Conversely, the parameter $\beta_{2c/p}$ is lower (0.29) and not significant, indicating that the Court's has a higher attitude towards consensus when judgements deal with issues in the conservative-progressive area.

Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that issues on the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty grounds push judges towards positions that more sincerely reveal their true preferences, while dissent suppression seems more likely to take place when cases deal with conservative-progressive issues.

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[32] A similar exercise could have also been conducted in the previous IRT analysis by averaging the discrimination parameters on cases challenging laws about the conservative-progressive division, on the one hand, and on those associated to cases challenging laws about the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty division, on the other hand. However, this approach would provide limited implications because in IRT models unanimous cases would not be included in the sample.

[Table eight]

VII. Model Simulation

In the previous sections we have found that judges' latent characteristics, then respectively traced to political ideology and dissent aversion, are statistically significant and operate in the expected direction in predicting judges' voting behavior. However, the results obtained could be questioned because the sub-sample of unanimous decisions contains a relatively low number of votes per judge. In order to provide further robustness to the results obtained, we proceeded with the simulation of the model to test its ability to correctly predict the latent traits of interest.

We simulate all the three versions of the model: baseline, one-dimension with individual predictors of the latent trait, and two-dimensions, retrieving all parameters and latent variables. Here, we illustrate the comprehensive procedure followed to simulate the two-dimensional model of Section IV.

First, we fix the number of individuals to 12, whereas the number of items is set equal to 15, for a total of 180 votes. Second, the predictors for the latent traits are generated. We build two continuous variables drawing from a normal distribution, while two binary variables are built drawing from a binomial distribution. We use these four variables as predictors for the two latent traits, adding a random term with zero mean and standard deviation equal to 0.5. Third, we construct one vector of item slopes and one vector of item difficulties drawing from a normal distribution, while a second vector of item slopes is fixed at 1. Fourth, we generate both the latent traits and the matrix of votes starting from the simulated variables, randomly replacing 47 votes with N.A., as in our original database. Finally, each model is estimated using the generated data. The procedure is repeated one thousand times. The same criterion has been adopted to simulate the one-dimensional models.

The outcome of the three simulations are reported in Table nine. The average resulting correlations between each iteration's simulated latent variables (θ) and their true value suggest that the predictive capacity of all the models is satisfactory, especially in models with predictors for θ. In particular, the first latent dimension is recovered well. The average correlation (over 1,000 replications of the procedure) between the simulated value and the true value of θ_{1j} is always significant and above 65% in all the three models. The correlation between the simulated and the true value of the second latent dimension (θ_{2j}) is quite satisfactory in the model with two latent variables (0.875).

In general, the (average values of the) diagnostic tests reported in Table nine suggest that the baseline model with ideal points' predictors offers the best performance, although the differences between the three are not large.

[Table 9]

VIII. Conclusions

Bidimensional courts are rare. We have used the *Consell de Garanties Estatutàries de Catalunya* to analyze the empirical determination of judicial ideal points when judges respond to two distinct policy dimensions. In this case, the two axes are the standard conservative-progressive (widely studied in the United States and around the world) and the specific Spanish-Catalan sovereignty. We have found out that both are relevant but in different ways. On the one hand, the specific Spanish-Catalan sovereignty axis seems to explain polarization or division in the Court (notwithstanding controversial cases where unanimous vote prevailed in important decisions against pro-Catalan sovereignty legislation). On the other hand, cases dealing with issues on the conventional conservative-progressive axis are related to dissent suppression or avoidance.

The results seem consistent with the observation that Catalan politics was dominated by the sovereignty question in the 2009-2015 period, leading to the collapse of the party system in the 2015 election. In fact, we could argue that the Court itself was a product of this dynamics. Furthermore, in terms of external visibility, the incentives were for judges to be known for their views in the more politically relevant dimension (including possible careers after completing the term in the Court).

As to the conservative-progressive dimension, not only it was less politically relevant in the 2009-2015 period, but also largely absent from the relationship between Catalonia and Spain since progressive parties ruled both for a while (in Catalonia up to December 2010, in Spain up to December 2011) followed by a new cycle of conservative parties ruling in both. Therefore, conflicts of legislation between Catalonia and Spain in matters contentious within a conservative-progressive dimension were rare. At the same time, given the current dynamics of the legal profession in Catalonia, there seem to be few incentives for judges to get known as "progressive" or " conservative" lawyers or law professors.

With current powers, the institution in analysis did not exist before 2009, which eliminates the possibility of testing if the two relevant dimensions, conservative-progressive and Spanish-Catalan sovereignty, played a significant different role in policy cycles dominated by distinct concerns.

As the party system as changed since the 2015 election, the composition of the *Consell de Garanties Estatutàries de Catalunya* will be adjusted as judges finish their terms. New parties will appoint new judges. Old parties will have fewer judges (since they are now less relevant). However, until the question of formal sovereignty is solved, the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty axis is likely to dominate the Court while ideological conservative-progressive agendas seem to be less influential.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

<p style="text-align:center">TABLE ONE
SUMMARY STATISTICS: CASES DECIDED BY THE CATALAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 2009-2015</p>

	Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
All cases (Nr of votes: 1098)	Year of filing	2012.7	1.838	2009	2015
	Year of decision	2012.7	1.843	2009	2015
	Tripartit Government	0.205	0.404	0	1
	CIU Government	0.795	0.404	0	1
	Length (avg nr. words)	47.137	28.421	12	159
Cases with dissenting opinions (Nr of votes: 133)	Year of filing	2012.3	1.758	2010	2015
	Year of decision	2012.4	1.801	2010	2015
	Tripartit Government	0.271	0.446	0	1
	CIU Government	0.729	0.446	0	1
	Length (avg nr. words)	71.489	34.567	28	159
Cases adjudicated by judges appointed by a conservative party (Nr of votes: 58)	Year of filing	2012.3	1.782	2010	2015
	Year of decision	2012.4	1.826	2010	2015
	Tripartit Government	0.276	0.451	0	1
	CIU Government	0.724	0.451	0	1
	Length (avg nr. words)	71.172	34.649	28	159
Cases adjudicated by judges appointed by a progressive party (Nr of votes: 75)	Year of filing	2012.3	1.750	2010	2015
	Year of decision	2012.4	1.793	2010	2015
	Tripartit Government	0.267	0.445	0	1
	CIU Government	0.733	0.445	0	1
	Length (avg nr. words)	71.733	34.735	28	159
Cases adjudicated by judges appointed by a pro-Spain sovereignty party (Nr of votes: 82)	Year of filing	2012.5	1.744	2010	2015
	Year of decision	2012.5	1.786	2010	2015
	Tripartit Government	0.244	0.432	0	1
	CIU Government	0.756	0.432	0	1
	Length (avg nr. words)	72.390	35.257	28	159
Cases adjudicated by judges appointed by a pro-Catalan sovereignty party (Nr of votes: 51)	Year of filing	2012.1	1.774	2010	2015
	Year of decision	2012.2	1.819	2010	2015
	Tripartit Government	0.314	0.469	0	1
	CIU Government	0.686	0.469	0	1
	Length (avg nr. words)	70.039	33.724	28	159

Source: CGEC, own database.
All statistics are weighted by the number of individual votes.

TABLE TWO

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CASES DECIDED BY THE CATALAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 2009-2015

Name	Year of Appointment	Age at the Year of Appointment	Gender (=1 Male, =0 Female)	President CGEC (if Yes, dates; =0 No)	Number of cases where this judge belongs to the resident college of judges	Number of cases where this judge was the Rapporteur	Appointing Party	Career Judge (=1 Yes, =0 No)	Law Professor (=1 Yes, =0 No)	Lawyer (=1 Yes, =0 No)
Joan Egea Fernández	2009	58	1	2013-	124	14	CIU	0	1	0
Pere Jover i Presa	2009	68	1	0	124	16	PSC	0	1	0
Eliseo Aja	2009	63	1	2009-2013	124	14	PSC	0	1	0
Marc Carrillo	2009	57	1	0	123	14	ICV-IUiA	0	1	0
Jaume Vernet i Llobet	2009	51	1	0	124	12	ERC	0	1	0
Àlex Bas i Vilafranca	2009	39	1	0	124	13	CIU	0	1	0
Francesc de Paula Caminal i Badia	2013	68	1	0	69	8	CIU	0	0	1
Joan Ridao i Martín	2013	46	1	0	68	8	ERC	0	1	0
Carles Jaume i Fernández	2013	45	1	0	68	8	PP	0	0	1
Julio Añoveros Trias de Bes	2009	67	1	0	40	5	PP	0	1	0
Antonia Agulló Agüero	2009	56	0	0	55	6	PSC	0	1	0
Enric Fossas Espadaler	2009	51	1	0	55	6	CIU	0	1	0

TABLE THREE

POLITICAL PARTIES ACCORDING TO CONSERVATIVE-PROGRESSIVE AND SPANISH-CATALAN SOVEREIGNTY AXES AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF JUDGE'S APPOINTERS

Conservative-progressive dimension		Conservative-progressive
PP	RIGHT	1
CiU	RIGHT	1
PSC	LEFT	0
ERC	LEFT	0
ICV	LEFT	0
Spanish-Catalan dimension		Spanish-Catalan
PP	SPANISH	1
PSC	SPANISH/ CATALAN	1
ICV	CATALAN/ SPANISH	0
CiU	CATALAN	0
ERC	CATALAN	0

Source: Own database.

TABLE FOUR
ONE-DIMENSION IRT ESTIMATES OF JUDGES' IDEOLOGY
BASELINE MODEL

JUDGES	IDEAL POINT	STD. ERR.	z-val [a]	APPOINTER'S POLITICAL AFFILIATION	APPOINTER: Pol_PC (CONSERVATIVE=1; PROGRESSIVE=0)	APPOINTER: Pol_SC (SPANISH=1; CATALAN=0)
Pere Jover i Presa	1.497	0.254	5.901	PSC	0	1
Carles Jaume i Fernández	1.171	0.561	2.086	PP	1	1
Eliseo Aja	0.623	0.256	2.435	PSC	0	1
Antonia Agulló Agüero	0.601	0.256	2.351	PSC	0	1
Francesc de Paula Caminal i Badia	0.129	0.546	0.236	CIU	1	0
Joan Ridao i Martín	0.099	0.257	0.385	ERC	0	0
Joan Egea Fernández	-0.262	0.120	2.185	CIU	1	0
Jaume Vernet i Llobet	-0.293	0.170	1.725	ERC	0	0
Àlex Bas i Vilafranca	-0.381	0.260	1.465	CIU	1	0
Enric Fossas Espadaler	-0.534	0.460	1.161	CIU	1	0
Marc Carrillo	-0.954	0.190	5.017	ICV-IUiA	0	0
Julio Añoveros Trias de Bes	-1.736	0.147	11.806	PP	1	1

Correlation between ideal points and dummy for whether the appointer is conservative -0.31, p-val. 0.33
Correlation between ideal points and dummy for whether the appointer is Spanish-oriented 0.43, p-val. 0.16

Correlation between ideal points (in absolute value) and the number of cases in the dataset where this judge belongs to the resident college of judges -0.07, p-val. 0.98
Correlation between ideal points (in absolute value) and the number of cases in the dataset where this judge provides a dissenting opinion 0.04, p-val. 0.99

Judges lying above the median (including the median judge with higher ideal point) appointed by the Conservatives 2
Judges lying below the median (including the median judge with lower ideal point) appointed by the Conservatives 4
Judges lying above the median (including the median judge with higher ideal point) appointed by the Spanish 4
Judges lying below the median (including the median judge with lower ideal point) appointed by the Spanish 1

Nr. observations (votes): 180. Median Judges in italics. [a] Critical values 2.58 (1% sign.), 1.96 (5% sign.), 1.65 (10% sign.). Std. errors clustered at the decision level.
Median judges in italic. p-val. associated to correlation coefficients are computed on two-tailed distributions.

TABLE FIVE
ONE-DIMENSION IRT ESTIMATES OF JUDGES' IDEOLOGY
MODEL WITH INDIVIDUAL PREDICTORS FOR JUDGES IDEOLOGY

JUDGES	IDEAL POINT	STD. ERR.	z-val [a]	APPOINTER'S POLITICAL AFFILIATION	APPOINTER: Pol_PC (CONSERVATIVE=1; PROGRESSIVE=0)	APPOINTER: Pol_SC (SPANISH=1; CATALAN=0)
Pere Jover i Presa	1.583	0.216	7.318	PSC	0	1
Carles Jaume i Fernández	1.149	0.581	1.978	PP	1	1
Eliseo Aja	0.606	0.318	1.907	PSC	0	1
Antonia Agulló Agüero	0.571	0.317	1.802	PSC	0	1
Francesc de Paula Caminal i Badia	0.052	0.426	0.122	CIU	1	0
Joan Ridao i Martín	-0.055	0.563	0.098	ERC	0	0
Joan Egea Fernández	-0.403	0.180	2.237	CIU	1	0
Jaume Vernet i Llobet	-0.417	0.280	1.488	ERC	0	0
Àlex Bas i Vilafranca	-0.528	0.248	2.127	CIU	1	0
Enric Fossas Espadaler	-0.649	0.475	1.368	CIU	1	0
Marc Carrillo	-1.145	0.185	6.187	ICV-IUiA	0	0
Julio Añoveros Trias de Bes	-1.861	0.091	20.512	PP	1	1

Correlation between ideal points and dummy for whether the appointer is conservative -0.31, p-val. 0.33
Correlation between ideal points and dummy for whether the appointer is Spanish-oriented 0.46, p-val. 0.13

Correlation between ideal points (in absolute value) and the number of cases in the dataset where this judge belongs to the resident college of judges -0.20, p-val. 0.53
Correlation between ideal points (in absolute value) and the number of cases in the dataset where this judge provides a dissenting opinion 0.00, p-val. 0.99

Judges lying above the median (including the median judge with higher ideal point) appointed by the Conservatives 2
Judges lying below the median (including the median judge with lower ideal point) appointed by the Conservatives 4
Judges lying above the median (including the median judge with higher ideal point) appointed by the Spanish sovereignty 4
Judges lying below the median (including the median judge with lower ideal point) appointed by the Spanish sovereignty 1

Nr. observations (votes): 180. Median Judges in italics. [a] Critical values 2.58 (1% sign.), 1.96 (5% sign.), 1.65 (10% sign.). Std. errors clustered at the decision level.
Median judges in italic. p-val. associated to correlation coefficients are computed on two-tailed distributions.

TABLE SIX
TWO-DIMENSION IRT ESTIMATES OF JUDGES' IDEOLOGY AND DISSENT PROPENSITY

JUDGES	IDEAL POINT	STD. ERR.	z-val [a]	APPOINTER'S POLITICAL AFFILIATION	APPOINTER: Pol_PC (CONSERVATIVE=1; PROGRESSIVE=0)	APPOINTER: Pol_SC (SPANISH=1; CATALAN=0)
ALLEGED POLITICAL DIMENSION						
Pere Jover i Presa	1.293	0.539	2.397	PSC	0	1
Carles Jaume i Fernández	0.858	0.330	2.596	PP	1	1
Eliseo Aja	0.453	0.485	0.934	PSC	0	1
Marc Carrillo	0.350	0.223	1.567	ICV-IUiA	0	0
Antonia Agulló Agüero	0.349	0.498	0.701	PSC	0	1
Julio Añoveros Trias de Bes	0.341	0.141	2.416	PP	1	1
Enric Fossas Espadaler	-0.272	0.512	0.532	CIU	1	0
Francesc de Paula Caminal i Badia	-0.274	0.470	0.582	CIU	1	0
Joan Ridao i Martín	-0.343	0.462	1.800	ERC	0	0
Joan Egea Fernández	-0.409	0.227	0.743	CIU	1	0
Jaume Vernet i Llobet	-0.986	0.469	2.103	ERC	0	0
Àlex Bas i Vilafranca	-1.433	0.562	2.550	CIU	1	0
PROPENSITY TOWARDS DISSENTING						
Marc Carrillo	1.100	0.485	2.271	ICV-IUiA	0	0
Julio Añoveros Trias de Bes	0.931	0.414	2.247	PP	1	1
Enric Fossas Espadaler	0.854	0.425	2.007	CIU	1	0
Joan Egea Fernández	0.645	0.390	1.656	CIU	1	0
Jaume Vernet i Llobet	0.491	0.459	1.070	ERC	0	0
Àlex Bas i Vilafranca	0.369	0.896	0.412	CIU	1	0
Francesc de Paula Caminal i Badia	-0.211	0.092	2.285	CIU	1	0
Joan Ridao i Martín	-0.311	0.431	0.722	ERC	0	0
Eliseo Aja	-0.312	0.351	0.890	PSC	0	1
Antonia Agulló Agüero	-1.093	0.405	2.702	PSC	0	1
Carles Jaume i Fernández	-1.253	0.677	1.851	PP	1	1
Pere Jover i Presa	-1.948	0.298	6.526	PSC	0	1

ALLEGED POLITICAL DIMENSION:
Correlation between ideal points and dummy for whether the appointer is conservative -0.26, p-val. 0.41
Correlation between ideal points and dummy for whether the appointer is Spanish-oriented 0.77, p-val. 0.00

Correlation between ideal points (in absolute value) and the number of cases in the dataset where this judge belongs to the resident college of judges -0.06, p-val. 0.85
Correlation between ideal points (in absolute value) and the number of cases in the dataset where this judge provides a dissenting opinion -0.18, p-val. 0.58

Judges lying above the median (including the median judge with higher ideal point) appointed by the Conservatives 2
Judges lying below the median (including the median judge with lower ideal point) appointed by the Conservatives 4
Judges lying above the median (including the median judge with higher ideal point) appointed by the Spanish sovereignty 5
Judges lying below the median (including the median judge with lower ideal point) appointed by the Spanish sovereignty 0

PROPENSITY TOWARDS DISSENTING:
Correlation between propensity towards dissenting and dummy for whether the appointer is conservative 0.31, p-val. 0.33
Correlation between propensity towards dissenting and dummy for whether the appointer is Spanish-oriented -0.61, p-val. 0.04

Correlation between propensity towards dissenting (in absolute value) and the number of cases in the dataset where this judge belongs to the resident college of judges 0.10, p-val. 0.76
Correlation between propensity towards dissenting (in absolute value) and the number of cases in the dataset where this judge provides a dissenting opinion 0.14, p-val. 0.66

Judges lying above the median (including the median judge with higher propensity towards dissenting) appointed by the Conservatives 5
Judges lying below the median (including the median judge with lower propensity towards dissenting) appointed by the Conservatives 2
Judges lying above the median (including the median judge with higher propensity towards dissenting) appointed by the Spanish sovereignty 1
Judges lying below the median (including the median judge with lower propensity towards dissenting) appointed by the Spanish sovereignty 4

Nr. observations (votes): 180. Median Judges in italics. [a] Critical values 2.58 (1% sign.), 1.96 (5% sign.), 1.65 (10% sign.). Std. errors clustered at the decision level.
Median judges in italic. p-val. associated to correlation coefficients are computed on two-tailed distributions.

TABLE SEVEN

FIRST-STAGE PREDICTORS OF ALLEGED SUPPRESSED DISSENTING AND JUDGES' POLITICAL PREFERENCES

	Dependent variable: First estimated dimension (IDEAL POINT) (θ_{1j})	STD. ERR.	Dependent variable: second estimated dimension (PROPENSITY TOWARDS DISSENT) (θ_{2j})	STD. ERR.
PREDICTORS	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
ONE-DIMENSION MODEL				
Age	-0.018	0.018		
Number of cases adjudicated	0.007	0.008		
Appointed by by a conservative party	-0.273	0.544		
Appointed by by a pro-Spain sovereignity party	1.047**	0.516		
R2	0.34			
TWO-DIMENSION MODEL				
Age	0.004	0.009	0.009	0.013
Number of cases adjudicated	-0.005	0.004	-0.002	0.006
Appointed by by a conservative party	-0.376	0.270	0.318	0.413
Appointed by by a pro-Spain sovereignity party	0.930***	0.305	-1.211**	0.468
R2	0.61		0.44	

TABLE EIGHT
TWO-DIMENSION IRT ESTIMATES OF JUDGES' IDEOLOGY, 2009-2015
PREDICTED VALUES ON THE FULL SAMPLE OF 55 JUDGES

	MEAN	SD	z-val [a]
β_2 (mean-slope)	-0.808	0.293	2.766
$\beta_{2c/p}$ (propensity towards dissent when the decisions of the Court deal with issues related to the conservative-progressive spectrum) – deviation from mean-slope	0.288	0.217	1.330
$\beta_{2S/C}$ (propensity towards dissent when the decisions of the Court deal with issues related to the Spanish-Catalan sovereignty spectrum) – deviation from mean-slope	0.957	0.207	4.632

Nr. Observations (votes): 1098. [a] Critical values 2.58 (1% sign.), 1.96 (5% sign.), 1.65 (10% sign.)

TABLE NINE
SIMULATION OF THE MODEL

Average correlation between simulated latent variables / model parameters and their true values (1,000 replications)	Baseline model	One-dimensional FIML model with ideal point predictors	Two-dimensional FIML model with ideal point predictors
θ_{1j}	0.693 (p-val 0.012)	0.938 (p-val 0.000)	0.660 (p-val 0.020)
θ_{2j}			0.875 (p-val 0.000)
BIC (average)	138.831	144.231	170.048
SABIC (average)	60.209	65.610	82.355
AIC (average)	126.223	131.624	155.986
AICc (average)	32.623	38.024	59.319
Log-likelihood (average)	-37.111	-39.812	-48.993
Convergence	Converged achieved after 51 EM iterations (average/1,000 rep.)	Converged achieved after 39 EM iterations (average/1,000 rep.)	Converged achieved after 28 EM iterations (average/1,000 rep.)

APPENDIX NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

**TABLE A.1 – CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CASES DECIDED BY
THE CATALAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 2009-2015**

YEAR FILED	YEAR DECIDED	LAW CHALLENGED (in Catalan)	IS THE CHALLENGED LAW ABOUT LEFT-RIGHT DIVISIONS? (=1 Yes, =0 No)	IS THE CHALLENGED LAW ABOUT CATALAN-SPANISH DIVISIONS? (=1 Yes, =0 No)	PETITIONER (name)	DEFENDANT (name)	IS THE DECISION PRO-PETITIONER? (=1 Yes, =0 No)	IS THE DECISION UNANIMOUS (=1 Yes, =0 No)	LENGTH OF DECISION (AVG NUMBER OF PAGES)
2009	2009	Projecte de llei del Síndic de Greuges (BOPC núm. 554, de 22 d'octubre de 2009)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	1	1	42
2009	2009	Llei de l'Estat 10/2009, de 20 d'octubre, de creació d'òrgans consultius de l'Estat a l'àmbit agroalimentari i de determinació de les bases de representació de les organitzacions professionals agràries (BOE núm. 254, de 21 d'octubre de 2009)	0	1	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Spanish Parliament	0	1	25
2010	2010	Projecte de llei de consultes populars per via de referèndum de Catalunya (BOPC núm. 621, de 29 de gener de 2010)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	1	1	28
2010	2010	Llei 25/2009, de 22 de desembre, de modificació de diverses lleis per a la seva adaptació a la Llei sobre el lliure accés a les activitats de serveis i el seu exercici (BOE núm. 308, de 23 de desembre de 2009)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	0	72
2010	2010	Projecte de llei de l'Agència Catalana d'Inspecció de Treball (BOPC núm. 655, de 18 de març de 2010)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	1	0	43
2010	2010	Projecte de llei d'acollida de les persones immigrades i les retornades a Catalunya (BOPC núm. 654, de 18 de març de 2010; correcció d'errades al BOPC núm. 662, de 29 de març de 2010)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	35
2010	2010	Decret llei 2/2010, de 30 de març, pel qual es modifica la Llei 11/2007, d'11 d'octubre, de la Corporació Catalana de Mitjans Audiovisuals (DOGC núm. 5600, d'1 d'abril de 2010)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Government	1	1	32
2010	2010	Projecte de llei del cinema (BOPC núm. 709, de 17 de maig de 2010)	1	1	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	0	59

2010	2010	Projecte de llei del codi de consum de Catalunya (BOPC núm. 714, de 19 de maig de 2010; correcció d'errades al BOPC núm. 741, de 16 de juny de 2010)	1	1	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	30
2010	2010	Reial decret 199/2010, de 26 de febrer, pel qual es regula l'exercici de la venda ambulant o no sedentària (BOE núm. 63, de 13 de març de 2010)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	25
2010	2010	Projecte de llei de vegueries (BOPC núm. 730, de 2 de juny de 2010)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	1	1	43
2010	2010	Proposició de llei de modificació de l'article 6 del Text refós de la Llei de protecció dels animals, aprovat pel Decret legislatiu 2/2008, de 15 d'abril (BOPC núm. 731, de 4 de juny de 2010)	1	1	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	0	38
2010	2010	Projecte de llei del llibre segon del Codi civil de Catalunya, relatiu a la persona i la família (BOPC núm. 728, de 2 de juny de 2010; correcció d'errades al BOPC núm. 741, de 16 de juny de 2010)	1	1	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	70
2010	2010	Projecte de llei de l'Àrea Metropolitana de Barcelona (BOPC núm. 730, de 2 de juny de 2010)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	33
2010	2010	Proposta de consulta popular per via de referèndum sobre la independència de la nació catalana (BOPC núm. 739, de 14 de juny de 2010)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	1	1	21
2010	2010	Reial decret llei 13/2009, de 26 d'octubre, pel qual es crea el Fons estatal per a l'ocupació i la sostenibilitat local (BOE núm. 259, de 27 d'octubre de 2009)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	39
2010	2010	Projecte de llei de règim jurídic i de procediment de les administracions públiques de Catalunya (BOPC núm. 738, d'11 de juny de 2010)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	51
2010	2010	Reial decret 405/2010, de 31 de març, pel qual es regula l'ús del logotip «Letra Q» en l'etiquetatge de la llet i els productes lactis (BOE núm. 79, d'1 d'abril de 2010; correcció d'errades al BOE núm. 118, de 14 de maig de 2010)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	32

2010	2010	Resolució de 25 de març de 2010, del secretari d'Estat d'Infraestructures i Planificació, per delegació del Ministre de Foment, per la qual s'estableixen els serveis essencials per a prestar en la concessió que ostenta l'empresa Autopistes Concessionària Espanyola SAU (ACESA), de les autopistes de peatge Montmeló-La Jonquera, Barcelona-Tarragona, Montmeló-El Papiol i Saragossa-Mediterrània, durant la vaga convocada per als dies 26, 27 i 30 de març i 4, 5 i 6 d'abril de 2010	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	0	1	24
2010	2010	Projecte de llei d'ús dels mitjans electrònics al sector públic de Catalunya (BOPC núm. 748, de 23 de juny de 2010)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	31
2010	2010	Proposició de llei de regulació de les festes tradicionals amb bous (BOPC núm. 772, de 19 de juliol de 2010)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	12
2010	2010	Projecte de llei de l'occità, aranès a l'Aran (BOPC núm. 750, de 23 de juny de 2010; correcció d'errades al BOPC núm. 762, de 7 de juliol de 2010)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	30
2010	2010	Projecte de llei de polítiques de joventut (BOE núm. 778, de 22 de juliol de 2010)	1	1	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	13
2010	2010	Projecte de llei de l'Autoritat Catalana de Protecció de Dades (BOPC núm. 777, de 22 de juliol de 2010)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	14
2010	2010	Llei 7/2010, de 31 de març, general de la comunicació audiovisual (BOE núm. 79, d'1 d'abril de 2010)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	0	1	48
2011	2011	Reial decret llei 13/2010, de 3 de desembre, d'actuacions en l'àmbit fiscal, laboral i liberalitzadores per fomentar la inversió i la creació d'ocupació (BOE núm. 293, de 3 de desembre de 2010)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	0	1	28
2011	2011	Llei 40/2010, de 29 de desembre, d'emmagatzematge geològic de diòxid de carboni (BOE núm. 317, de 30 de desembre de 2010)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	63

2011	2011	Reial decret 1715/2010, de 17 de desembre, pel qual es designa l'Entitat Nacional d'Acreditació (ENAC) com a organisme nacional d'acreditació d'acord amb el que estableix el Reglament (CE) núm. 765/2008 del Parlament Europeu i el Consell, de 9 de juliol de 2008, pel qual s'estableixen els requisits d'acreditació i vigilància del mercat relatius a la comercialització dels productes i pel qual es deroga el Reglament (CEE) núm. 339/93 (BOE núm. 7, de 8 de gener de 2011)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	32
2011	2011	Reial decret 102/2011, de 28 de gener, relatiu a la millora de la qualitat de l'aire (BOE núm. 25, de 29 de gener de 2011)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	46
2011	2011	Pla de socors binacional del túnel del Pertús de la línia d'alta velocitat Perpinyà-Figueres	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	22
2011	2011	Llei 2/2011, de 4 de març, d'economia sostenible (BOE núm. 55, de 5 de març de 2011)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	0	91
2011	2011	Llei 34/2006, de 30 d'octubre, sobre l'accés a les professions d'advocat i procurador dels tribunals (BOE núm. 143, de 16 de juny de 2011)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	34
2011	2011	Reial decret llei 8/2011, d'1 de juliol, de mesures de suport als deutors hipotecaris, de control de la despesa pública i cancel·lació de deutes amb empreses i autònoms contrets per les entitats locals, de foment de l'activitat empresarial i impuls de la rehabilitació i de simplificació administrativa (BOE núm. 161, de 7 de juliol de 2011)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	51
2011	2011	Reial decret 804/2011, de 10 de juny, pel qual es regula l'ordenació zootècnica, sanitària i de benestar animal de les explotacions equines i s'estableix el Pla sanitari equí (BOE núm. 157, de 2 de juliol de 2011)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	34

2011	2011	Pla estatal de protecció civil davant el risc d'inundacions, aprovat per Acord del Consell de Ministres de 29 de juliol de 2011, publicat per Resolució de 2 d'agost de 2011 de la Subsecretaria del Ministeri de l'Interior (BOE núm. 210, d'1 de setembre de 2011)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	0	1	33
2011	2012	Decret llei 3/2011, de 20 de desembre, de mesures urgents en matèria de tresoreria (DOGC núm. 6028 Annex, de 20 de desembre de 2011)	1	1	2 groups of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Government	0	1	30
2012	2012	Decret llei 4/2011, de 20 de desembre, de necessitats financeres del sector públic en pròrroga pressupostària (DOGC núm. 6030, de 22 de desembre de 2011)	1	0	2 groups of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Government	0	0	41
2012	2012	Reial decret 1494/2011, de 24 d'octubre, pel qual es regula el Fons de carboni per a una economia sostenible (BOE núm. 270, de 9 de novembre de 2011)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	32
2012	2012	Projecte de llei de mesures fiscals i financeres i de creació de l'impost sobre les estades en establiments turístics (BOPC núm. 249, de 10 de febrer de 2012)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	63
2012	2012	Reial decret llei 3/2012, de 10 de febrer, de mesures urgents per a la reforma del mercat laboral (BOE núm. 36, d'11 de febrer de 2012; correcció d'errades: BOE núm. 42, de 18 de febrer de 2012)	1	1	2 groups of Catalan Parliament + 1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Spanish Parliament	1	1	105
2012	2012	Reial decret llei 16/2012, de 20 d'abril, de mesures urgents per garantir la sostenibilitat del Sistema Nacional de Salut i millorar la qualitat i la seguretat de les seves prestacions (BOE núm. 98, de 24 d'abril de 2012; correcció d'errades: BOE núm. 116, de 15 de maig de 2012)	1	1	2 groups of Catalan Parliament + Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	0	123
2012	2012	Reial decret llei 14/2012, de 20 d'abril, de mesures urgents de racionalització de la despesa pública en l'àmbit educatiu (BOE núm. 96, de 21 d'abril de 2012)	1	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	57
2012	2012	Llei orgànica 2/2012, de 27 d'abril, d'estabilitat pressupostària i sostenibilitat financera (BOE núm. 103, de 30 d'abril de 2012)	1	0	1/10 members of Parliament	Spanish Parliament	1	0	53

2012	2012	Llei 2/2012, de 29 de juny, de pressupostos generals de l'Estat per a l'any 2012 (BOE núm. 156, de 30 de juny de 2012)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	24
2012	2012	Llei 3/2012, de 6 de juliol, de mesures urgents per a la reforma del mercat laboral (BOE núm. 162, de 7 de juliol de 2012)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Spanish Parliament	0	1	31
2012	2012	Reial decret llei 20/2012, de 13 de juliol, de mesures per garantir l'estabilitat pressupostària i foment de la competitivitat (BOE núm. 168, de 14 de juliol de 2012; correcció d'errades: BOE núm. 172, de 19 de juliol de 2012)	1	0	Catalan Government + 1/10 members of Parliament	Spanish Parliament	1	1	141
2012	2012	Llei 2/2012, de 29 de juny, de pressupostos generals de l'Estat per a l'any 2012 (BOE núm. 156, de 30 de juny de 2012)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	31
2012	2012	Ordre SSI/1209/2012, de 4 de juny, per la qual s'estableixen les bases reguladores de la concessió de subvencions sotmeses al règim general de subvencions de la Secretaria d'Estat de Serveis Socials i Igualtat (BOE núm. 136, de 7 de juny de 2012)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	37
2012	2012	Ordre SSI/1199/2012, de 4 de juny, per la qual s'estableixen les bases reguladores i es convoca la concessió de subvencions per a la realització de programes de cooperació i voluntariat socials amb càrrec a l'assignació tributària de l'impost sobre la renda de les persones físiques (BOE núm. 135, de 6 de juny de 2012)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	34
2012	2012	Reial decret 1070/2012, de 13 de juliol, pel qual s'aprova el Pla estatal de protecció civil davant el risc químic (BOE núm. 190, de 9 d'agost de 2012)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	0	1	26
2012	2012	Resolució de 31 d'agost de 2012, de la Secretaria d'Estat de Cultura, per la qual es convoquen ajuts a corporacions locals per a activitats culturals que fomentin la comunicació cultural, corresponents a l'any 2012 (BOE núm. 216, de 7 de setembre de 2012)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	35

2012	2012	Reial decret 1529/2012, de 8 de novembre, pel qual es desplega el contracte per a la formació i l'aprenentatge i s'estableixen les bases de la formació professional dual (BOE núm. 270, de 9 de novembre de 2012)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	26
2012	2013	Llei 10/2012, de 20 de novembre, per la qual es regulen determinades taxes en l'àmbit de l'Administració de justícia i de l'Institut Nacional de Toxicologia i Ciències Forenses (BOE núm. 280, de 21 de novembre)	1	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	57
2013	2013	Llei 16/2012, de 27 de desembre, per la qual s'adopten diverses mesures tributàries dirigides a la consolidació de les finances públiques i a l'impuls de l'activitat econòmica (BOE núm. 312, de 28 de desembre de 2012)	1	1	Catalan Government + 1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Spanish Parliament	1	1	30
2013	2013	Llei 17/2012, de 27 de desembre, de pressupostos generals de l'Estat per a l'any 2013 (BOE núm. 312, de 28 de desembre de 2012)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	27
2013	2013	Reial decret llei 4/2013, de mesures de suport a l'emprenedor i d'estímul del creixement i de la creació d'ocupació (BOE núm. 47, de 23 de febrer de 2013; correcció d'errades: BOE núm. 51, de 28 de febrer de 2013)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	38
2013	2013	Reial decret 189/2013, de 15 de març, pel qual es modifica el Reial decret 34/2008, de 18 de gener, pel qual es regulen els certificats de professionalitat i els reials decrets pels quals s'estableixen certificats de professionalitat dictats en la seva aplicació (BOE núm. 69, de 21 de març de 2013)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	24

2013	2013	Reial decret 239/2013, de 5 d'abril, pel qual s'estableixen les normes per a l'aplicació del Reglament (CE) núm. 1221/2009 del Parlament Europeu i del Consell, de 25 de novembre de 2009, relatiu a la participació voluntària d'organitzacions en un sistema comunitari de gestió i auditoria mediambientals (EMAS), i pel qual es deroguen el Reglament (CE) núm. 761/2001 i les decisions 2001/681/CE i 2006/193/CE de la Comissió (BOE num. 89, de 13 d'abril de 2013)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	31
2013	2013	Llei 2/2013, de 29 de maig, de protecció i ús sostenible del litoral i de modificació de la Llei 22/1988, de 28 de juliol, de costes (BOE núm. 129, de 30 de maig de 2013)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	54
2013	2013	Resolució de 13 de maig de 2013, de la Secretaria d'Estat de la Seguretat Social, per la qual s'estableix el Pla general d'activitats preventives de la Seguretat Social, que han d'aplicar les mútues d'accidents de treball i malalties professionals de la Seguretat Social en la planificació de les seves activitats per a l'any 2013 (BOE núm. 122, de 22 de maig de 2013)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	19
2013	2013	Llei 8/2013, de 26 de juny, de rehabilitació, regeneració i renovació urbanes (BOE núm. 153, de 27 de juny de 2013)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	76
2013	2013	Llei orgànica 4/2013, de 28 de juny, de reforma del Consell General del Poder Judicial, per la qual es modifica la Llei orgànica 6/1985, d'1 de juliol, del poder judicial (BOE núm. 155, de 29 de juny de 2013)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	0	1	34
2013	2013	Reial decret 396/2013, de 7 de juny, pel qual es regula el Comitè tècnic estatal de l'Administració judicial electrònica (BOE núm. 146, de 19 de juny de 2013)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	0	1	33

2013	2013	Llei 13/2013, de 2 d'agost, de foment de la integració de cooperatives i d'altres entitats associatives de caràcter agroalimentari (BOE núm. 185, de 3 d'agost de 2013; correcció d'errades: BOE núm. 224, de 18 de setembre de 2013)	1	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	40
2013	2013	Llei 12/2013, de 2 d'agost, de mesures per millorar el funcionament de la cadena alimentària (BOE núm. 185, de 3 d'agost de 2013)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	36
2013	2013	Reial decret llei 11/2013, de 2 d'agost, per a la protecció dels treballadors a temps parcial i altres mesures urgents en l'ordre econòmic i social (BOE núm. 185, de 3 d'agost de 2013)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	28
2013	2013	Reial decret 609/2013, de 2 d'agost, pel qual s'estableixen els llindars de renda i patrimoni familiar i les quanties de les beques i els ajuts a l'estudi per al curs 2013-2014, i es modifica parcialment el Reial decret 1721/2007, de 21 de desembre, pel qual s'estableix el règim de les beques i els ajuts a l'estudi personalitzats, així com sobre la Resolució de 13 d'agost de 2013, de la Secretaria d'Estat d'Educació, Formació Professional i Universitats, per la qual es convoquen beques de caràcter general per al curs acadèmic 2013-2014, per a estudiants que cursin estudis postobligatoris (BOE núm. 185, de 3 d'agost de 2013, i núm. 198, de 19 d'agost de 2013, respectivament)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	33
2013	2013	Decret llei 5/2013, de 22 d'octubre, de mesures de racionalització i simplificació de l'estructura del sector públic de la Generalitat de Catalunya (DOGC núm. 6487, de 24 d'octubre de 2013, i BOPC núm. 176, de 30 d'octubre de 2013)	1	0	1/10 members of Parliament	Catalan Government	1	1	29

2013	2013	Decret llei 4/2013, de 22 d'octubre, pel qual s'autoritza l'Institut Català de Finances a constituir una societat anònima perquè actuï com a entitat de crèdit i es modifiquen determinats preceptes del Text refós de la Llei de l'Institut Català de Finances, aprovat pel Decret legislatiu 4/2002, de 24 de desembre (DOGC núm. 6488, de 25 d'octubre de 2013, i BOPC núm. 176, de 30 d'octubre de 2013)	1	0	1/10 members of Parliament	Catalan Government	1	1	25
2013	2013	Reial decret 635/2013, de 2 d'agost, pel qual, en desplegament del «Pla d'impuls al medi ambient en el sector hoteler PIMA SOL», per a la rehabilitació energètica de les seves instal·lacions, es regula l'adquisició de crèdits futurs de carboni pel Fons de carboni per a una economia sostenible (BOE núm. 209, de 31 d'agost de 2013)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	29
2013	2013	Llei 14/2013, de 27 de setembre, de suport als emprenedors i la seva internacionalització, pel qual s'afegeix una nova disposició addicional dissetena a la Llei 31/1995, de 8 de novembre, de prevenció de riscos laborals (BOE núm. 233, de 28 de setembre de 2013)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	24
2013	2013	Proposició de llei d'horaris comercials i determinades activitats de promoció (BOPC núm. 195, de 20 de novembre de 2013)	1	1	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	1	1	38
2013	2014	Projecte de llei de pressupostos de la Generalitat de Catalunya per al 2014 (BOPC núm. 214, de 12 de desembre de 2013)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	1	0	28
2014	2014	Projecte de llei de mesures fiscals, administratives, financeres i del sector públic (BOPC núm. 215, de 13 de desembre de 2013)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	1	1	55
2014	2014	Llei orgànica 8/2013, de 9 de desembre, per a la millora de la qualitat educativa (BOE núm. 295, de 10 de desembre de 2013)	1	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	0	82
2014	2014	Llei orgànica 8/2013, de 9 de desembre, per a la millora de la qualitat educativa (BOE núm. 295, de 10 de desembre de 2013)	1	1	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Spanish Parliament	1	0	108

2014	2014	Llei 20/2013, de 9 de desembre, de garantia de la unitat de mercat (BOE núm. 295, de 10 de desembre de 2013)	1	1	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Spanish Parliament	1	1	80
2014	2014	Llei 21/2013, de 9 de desembre, d'avaluació ambiental (BOE núm. 296, d'11 de desembre de 2013)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	80
2014	2014	Llei 24/2013, de 26 de desembre, del sector elèctric (BOE núm. 310, de 27 de desembre de 2013)	1	1	Catalan Government + 1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Spanish Parliament	1	1	52
2014	2014	Llei 27/2013, de 27 de desembre, de racionalització i sostenibilitat de l'Administració local (BOE núm. 312, de 30 de desembre de 2013)	1	1	Catalan Government + 1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Spanish Parliament	1	1	122
2014	2014	Projecte de llei de l'impost sobre els dipòsits en les entitats de crèdit (BOPC núm. 245, de 23 de gener de 2014)	1	1	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	29
2014	2014	Llei 23/2013, de 23 de desembre, reguladora del factor de sostenibilitat i l'índex de revaloració del sistema de pensions de la Seguretat Social (BOE núm. 309, de 26 de desembre de 2013)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Spanish Parliament	0	1	26
2014	2014	Llei 22/2013, de 23 de desembre, de pressupostos generals de l'Estat per a l'any 2014 (BOE núm. 309, de 26 de desembre de 2013; correcció d'errades: BOE núm. 50, de 27 de febrer de 2014)	1	1	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Spanish Parliament	0	1	33
2014	2014	Reial decret 1048/2013, de 27 de desembre, pel qual s'estableix la metodologia per al càlcul de la retribució de l'activitat de distribució d'energia elèctrica (BOE núm. 312, de 30 de desembre de 2013)	1	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	37
2014	2014	Projecte de llei de modificació de la Llei 2/1989, de 16 de febrer, sobre centres recreatius turístics, i d'establiment de normes en matèria de tributació, comerç i joc (BOPC núm. 296, de 4 d'abril de 2014)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	0	59
2014	2014	Llei 2/2014, de 25 de març, de l'acció i del servei exterior de l'Estat (BOE núm. 74, de 26 de març de 2014; correcció d'errades: BOE núm. 117, de 14 de maig de 2014)	1	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	0	1	45

2014	2014	Decret llei 2/2014, de 10 de juny, de modificació de la Llei 31/2010, de 3 d'agost, de l'Àrea Metropolitana de Barcelona (DOGC núm. 6642, de 12 de juny de 2014)	1	1	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Government	0	0	55
2014	2014	Decret llei 3/2014, de 17 de juny, pel qual s'estableixen mesures urgents per a l'aplicació a Catalunya de la Llei 27/2013, de 27 de desembre, de racionalització i sostenibilitat de l'Administració local (DOGC núm. 6647, de 19 de juny de 2014; correcció d'errades: DOGC núm. 6651, de 26 de juny de 2014)	1	1	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Government	1	1	33
2014	2014	Proposició de llei per a garantir els drets de lesbianes, gais, bisexuals, transsexuals i intersexuals i per a eradicar l'homofòbia i la transfòbia (BOPC núm. 363, de 15 de juliol de 2014)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	45
2014	2014	Projecte de llei de l'impost sobre l'emissió d'òxids de nitrogen a l'atmosfera produïda per l'aviació comercial, de l'impost sobre l'emissió de gasos i partícules a l'atmosfera produïda per la indústria i de l'impost sobre la producció termonuclear d'energia elèctrica (BOPC núm. 368, de 17 de juliol de 2014)	1	1	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	1	1	28
2014	2014	Proposició de llei de consultes populars no referendàries i d'altres formes de participació ciutadana (BOPC núm. 366, de 17 de juliol de 2014)	1	1	2 groups of Catalan Parliament + 1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	0	159
2014	2014	Reial decret 413/2014, de 6 de juny, pel qual es regula l'activitat de producció d'energia elèctrica a partir de fonts d'energia renovables, cogeneració i residus (BOE núm. 140, de 10 de juny de 2014)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	28
2014	2014	Reial decret 591/2014, d'11 de juliol, pel qual es regulen els procediments administratius relatius al reconeixement de la compensació dels costos d'escolarització previstos en l'apartat 4 de la disposició addicional trenta-vuitena de la Llei orgànica 2/2006, de 3 de maig, d'educació (BOE núm. 184, de 30 de juliol de 2014)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	35

2014	2014	Llei 9/2014, de 9 de maig, general de telecomunicacions (BOE núm. 114, de 10 de maig de 2014)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	49
2014	2014	Projecte de llei d'acció exterior i de relacions amb la Unió Europea (BOPC núm. 407, de 9 d'octubre de 2014)	1	1	More than 1/10 members of the Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	33
2014	2014	Llei 15/2014, de 16 de setembre, de racionalització del sector públic i altres mesures de reforma administrativa (BOE núm. 226, de 17 de setembre de 2014)	1	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	58
2014	2014	Reial decret llei 13/2014, de 3 d'octubre, pel qual s'adopten mesures urgents en relació amb el sistema gasista i la titularitat de centrals nuclears (BOE núm. 241, de 4 d'octubre de 2014)	1	1	Generalitat + 1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Spanish Parliament	1	1	42
2014	2014	Llei 18/2014, de 15 d'octubre, d'aprovació de mesures urgents per al creixement, la competitivitat i l'eficiència (BOE núm. 252, de 17 d'octubre de 2014)	1	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	154
2014	2015	Llei 25/2014, de 27 de novembre, de tractats i altres acords internacionals (BOE núm. 288, de 28 de novembre de 2014)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	0	1	42
2015	2015	Projecte de llei de pressupostos de la Generalitat de Catalunya per al 2015 (BOPC núm. 485, de 28 de gener de 2015)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	1	1	38
2015	2015	Projecte de llei de mesures fiscals, financeres i administratives (BOPC núm. 486, de 28 de gener de 2015)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	1	1	69
2015	2015	Llei 32/2014, de 22 de desembre, de metrologia (BOE núm. 309, de 23 de desembre de 2014)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	34
2015	2015	Decret llei 1/2015, de 24 de març, de mesures extraordinàries i urgents per a la mobilització dels habitatges provinents de processos d'execució hipotecària (DOGC núm. 6839, de 26 de març de 2015)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Government	0	0	65

2015	2015	Ordre HAP/196/2015, de 21 de gener, per la qual s'aproven les bases reguladores de les subvencions que tinguin per finalitat l'execució d'obres de reparació o restitució d'infraestructures, equipaments i instal·lacions i serveis de titularitat municipal i de les mancomunitats, conseqüència de catàstrofes naturals, així com xarxes viàries de les diputacions provincials, cabildos, consells insulars i comunitats autònomes uniprovincials (BOE núm. 37, de 12 de febrer de 2015)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	45
2015	2015	Llei orgànica 4/2015, de 30 de març, de protecció de la seguretat ciutadana (BOE núm. 77, de 31 de març de 2015)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Spanish Parliament	1	1	139
2015	2015	Reial decret llei 4/2015, de 22 de març, per a la reforma urgent del sistema de formació professional per a l'ocupació en l'àmbit laboral (BOE núm. 70, de 23 de març de 2015; correcció d'errades: BOE núm. 91, de 16 d'abril de 2015)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	32
2015	2015	Projecte de llei d'ordenació del sistema d'ocupació i del Servei Públic d'Ocupació de Catalunya (BOPC núm. 560, de 30 d'abril de 2015)	1	1	2 groups of Catalan Parliament + 1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	1	1	37
2015	2015	Projecte de llei de simplificació de l'activitat administrativa de l'Administració de la Generalitat i dels governs locals de Catalunya i d'impuls de l'activitat econòmica (BOPC núm. 585, de 28 de maig de 2015)	1	0	2 groups of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	1	1	57
2015	2015	Proposició de llei de modificació de l'article 6 del Text refós de la Llei de protecció dels animals, aprovat pel Decret legislatiu 2/2008 (BOPC núm. 606, de 19 de juny de 2015)	1	0	1/10 members of Catalan Parliament	Catalan Parliament	0	1	22
2015	2015	Llei 10/2015, de 26 de maig, per a la salvaguarda del patrimoni cultural immaterial (BOE núm. 126, de 27 de maig de 2015)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	63
2015	2015	Llei 17/2015, de 9 de juliol, del Sistema Nacional de Protecció Civil (BOE núm. 164, de 10 de juliol de 2015)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	44

2015	2015	Llei 20/2015, de 14 de juliol, d'ordenació, supervisió i solvència de les entitats asseguradores i reasseguradores (BOE núm. 168, de 15 de juliol de 2015)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	0	1	26
2015	2015	Llei 26/2015, de 28 de juliol, de modificació del sistema de protecció a la infància i l'adolescència (BOE núm. 180, de 29 de juliol de 2015)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	55
2015	2015	Llei 28/2015, de 30 de juliol, per a la defensa de la qualitat alimentària (BOE núm. 182, de 31 de juliol de 2015)	1	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	48
2015	2015	Llei 30/2015, de 9 de setembre, per la qual es regula el sistema de formació professional per a l'ocupació en l'àmbit laboral (BOE núm. 217, de 10 de setembre de 2015)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	30
2015	2015	Llei 36/2015, de 28 de setembre, de seguretat nacional (BOE núm. 233, de 29 de setembre de 2015)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	52
2015	2015	Llei orgànica 15/2015, de 16 d'octubre, de reforma de la Llei orgànica 2/1979, de 3 d'octubre, del Tribunal Constitucional, per a l'execució de les resolucions del Tribunal Constitucional com a garantia de l'estat de dret (BOE núm. 249, de 17 d'octubre de 2015)	1	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	64
2015	2015	Llei 33/2015, de 21 de setembre, per la qual es modifica la Llei 42/2007, de 13 de desembre, del patrimoni natural i de la biodiversitat (BOE núm. 227, de 22 de setembre de 2015)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	46
2015	2015	Llei 43/2015, de 9 d'octubre, del tercer sector d'acció social (BOE núm. 243, de 10 d'octubre de 2015)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	40
2015	2015	Llei 37/2015, de 29 de setembre, de carreteres (BOE núm. 234, de 30 de setembre de 2015)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	46
2015	2015	Llei 39/2015, d'1 d'octubre, del procediment administratiu comú de les administracions públiques (BOE núm. 236, de 2 d'octubre de 2015)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	68
2015	2015	Llei 40/2015, d'1 d'octubre, de règim jurídic del sector públic (BOE núm. 236, d'1 d'octubre de 2015)	1	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	133

2015	2015	Llei 45/2015, de 14 d'octubre, de voluntariat (BOE núm. 247, de 15 d'octubre de 2015)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Parliament	1	1	31
2015	2015	Reial decret 900/2015, de 9 d'octubre, pel qual es regulen les condicions administratives, tècniques i econòmiques de les modalitats de subministrament d'energia elèctrica amb autoconsum i de producció amb autoconsum (BOE núm. 243, de 10 d'octubre de 2015)	0	1	Catalan Government	Spanish Government	1	1	46